Imagined Weakness: The peaceful riser identity and Beijing’s policy overcorrection in the South China Sea

Abstract This article investigates why Beijing’s South China Sea (SCS) policy has become predominantly coercive under Xi Jinping. It argues that an identity–policy discrepancy, rooted in Chinese strategic culture and intensified during Hu Jintao’s tenure, served as a key catalyst. The gap between Hu’s peaceful riser identity and the assertive actions taken in the SCS created an ‘imagined weakness’ that the Xi administration sought to correct, resulting in an overcorrection that surpassed Hu’s already assertive approach. By tracing shifts in China’s discourse and policy over time, the article highlights the continuity between the Hu and Xi eras and examines how the former influenced the latter’s strategic trajectory—a critical yet often overlooked dimension for understanding China’s evolving approach to the SCS and its foreign policy more broadly.