From Institutions to Individuals: Cohen’s Critique of the Application of Rawls’s Difference Principle

罗尔斯将其看待正义的方式称为“作为公平的正义”，因而将社会的基本结构作为其正义原则的适用对象，将正义理论限制于基本结构，将人们日常生活的个人选择排除在此范围外。科恩在《拯救正义与平等》中从对激励论证的批判、对基本结构异议的回应等方面论述了罗尔斯对于差别原则运用的不恰当，指出正义的适用对象不应限制在社会基本结构，除了强制性制度的强约束，还需要一种道德风尚来引领人们日常生活的选择。本文基于罗尔斯的论述及科恩对于罗尔斯的批判，阐述了罗尔斯的理论局限，力图展现科恩所构建的社会主义平等观对人类自由而全面解放的追求。John Rawls characterizes his conception of justice as “justice as fairness,” thereby restricting the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure of society and excluding individual choices in everyday life from its domain. In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen criticizes this limitation by challenging Rawls’s incentive-based justification and responding to the basic structure objection. Cohen argues that justice should not be confined to coercive institutional arrangements but must also encompass a moral ethos that guides individuals’ daily decisions. Based on Rawls’s original arguments and Cohen’s critiques, this paper analyzes the limitations of Rawlsian theory and seeks to highlight Cohen’s vision of socialist equality as part of the broader pursuit of human freedom and comprehensive emancipation.