Political Transition, Structural Inequality, and the Persistence of Bribery in Ghana (1999–2022)

Bribery and corruption take diverse forms worldwide yet share common drivers. This study examines the persistence of petty bribery in Ghana across six electoral cycles from 1999 to 2022, drawing on nationally representative Afrobarometer survey data. It integrates insights from neo-patrimonialism, structural inequality, rational choice, and relative deprivation theories to explain how political transitions, economic disparities, and perceptions of unfairness contribute to the normalization of bribery in public service delivery. Using logistic regression models and longitudinal trend analysis, the article shows that bribery surges during democratic transitions, particularly when ruling parties change. The findings also reveal that structurally marginalized populations—especially rural, low-income, and less-educated groups—face disproportionately high exposure to bribery, though this pattern has shifted over time. The study argues that democratic institutions alone cannot curb corruption when underlying structural inequalities and informal governance networks remain intact. By combining institutional analysis with sociological theories of inequality, this article contributes to current debates on governance failure, political accountability, and corruption in lower-middle income countries. The Ghanaian case offers broader implications for understanding why anti-corruption reforms often stall in electorally competitive but structurally unequal societies.