Beyond Landes Posner Model: Modelling Independent Judiciary Based On Social Choice Theory

The paper presents a novel model of an independent judiciary based on moderate and rational assumptions within the framework of Social Choice Theory. This model seeks to address a fundamental question: Why is the judiciary granted structural and functional independence, greater than constitutionally envisioned, in modern democratic political institutions, despite certain constitutional authority of other branches of government to curtail such independence? This model improves upon earlier frameworks, such as the Landes-Posner model, which relies on rigid assumptions and when tested to its limitations, the Landes-Posner model fails to accurately reflect judicial institutions. The key finding of this paper is that other branches of government allow judicial independence as a rational mechanism to resolve issues arising from cyclical preferences in decision-making (preference deadlocks). By providing a stable and impartial resolution, the judiciary plays a crucial role in maintaining institutional equilibrium.