Risk, Deprivation, and Revolt: An Economic Examination of Bangladesh’s Political Unrest

The essay examines the violence that unfurled in Bangladesh in 2024 from the lens of the relative deprivation theory to explain the role of perceived inequality in political violence, and the prospect theory to explain the role of prospect losses as a motivation for individuals to participate in political violence. The essay analyses the events that acted as a trigger for the social unrest and focuses on the contentious quota to explain the decision-making process of the players involved, from the viewpoint of the prospect theory. The essay also looks at macroeconomic variables such as youth unemployment, inflation etc. during both the years that marked a social unrest among the general population and found that in both years, the economy had shown worrying trends. The essay also looks at the role of costs and benefits as perceived by an individual while making a choice in a risky situation. The conceptual framework is further demonstrated by a game where the decision-making process of the government, as a player, is discussed. It is found that the equilibrium for both the players is at the first outcome, where the participation is met with suppression by the government. The most ideal outcome for both the parties is a peaceful approach to the issue at hand. Based on the existing research, and the game theory, policy recommendations have been formulated emphasizing the need for a stronger penal system, to augment the costs that are associated with participation in violence, and to make infrastructural developments to address the socio-economic issues at hand. The establishment of transparent communication channels would also go a long way in mitigating the risks of future unrest.