Study on the Dynamics of China-US Economic and Trade Game and Reconstruction of International Law Order under Trump 2.0 New Deal

This paper investigates the legalized competition between China and the United States in economic and trade relations under the Trump 2.0 New Deal, revealing its deep impact on the international legal order. It analyzes how the U.S. has institutionalized national security within its America First strategy through tools such as reciprocal tariffs, export controls, long-arm jurisdiction, and the unreliable entity list. These measures aim to restructure global supply chains and suppress Chinas industrial upgrading. Drawing on international law and international relations theoriesparticularly offensive realism, institutional hegemony, and hegemonic preservationthe study explores Chinas legal responses, including the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the Export Control Law, as part of a broader strategy to achieve technological autonomy and institutional innovation. Methodologically, the paper adopts a multi-level analytical framework to examine the international, domestic, and institutional motivations behind the U.S. legal strategy, while also assessing the legitimacy of U.S. and Chinese unilateral sanctions under international law. The research finds that this form of lawfare has accelerated the decline of multilateralism, fragmented global legal norms, and exposed regulatory vacuums in emerging sectors. In response, the paper proposes policy recommendations for China focused on strengthening multilateral cooperation, refining domestic legislation, and advancing a law-based technology promotion strategy. By integrating theory with practical analysis, this study offers fresh perspectives on the legal power struggle between major states and provides informed guidance for Chinas engagement in global governance and international rule-making.