Resilient Cyber-Physical System Honeypots for Cyberattacker Engagement
Industrial cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly facing sophisticated threats. As such, understanding the evolving strategies of cyberattacks is vital for proactive defense. CPS honeypots represent an effective tool for distracting cyberattackers from actual targets, while gleaning insights into their strategies. This article proposes a novel CPS honeypot framework that leverages rich physical models to deceive threat actors, extend their engagement, and glean valuable data. We propose the use of safety critical control to adaptively resist attackers luring them into further engagement providing deeper insights into their tactics. A microgrid-based case study demonstrates the honeypot’s ability to handle intelligent attack scenarios, ensuring prolonged engagement without compromising covertness, as well as the potential of CPS honeypots to enhance threat intelligence.
Authors
- Deepa Kundur (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5999-1847)
- Amr S. Mohamed (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6812-4200)
Institutions
- University of Toronto (CA)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Published
- 2025-07-24
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2025.3584527
- Primary Topic
- Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada