Cost-Driven Auction Mechanism for SFC Allocation in Space-Air-Ground Integrated Network

Service Function Chaining (SFC) is a fundamental technology for resource management in Space-Air-Ground Integrated Network (SAGIN). The heterogeneity and dynamic nature of network resources in SAGIN increase the complexity of SFC-based resource allocation. However, existing work rarely considers the issue of economically efficient resource allocation under cost constraints. To solve the issue, this study explicitly analyzes resource characteristics and establishes a cost-driven online auction mechanism for SFC allocation. First, we formulate a novel SFC allocation problem for SAGIN, aiming at maximizing social welfare while considering operational costs. We then adopt Fenchel duality to convert the primal problem into a dual problem and design a payment strategy that facilitates the dynamic updating of resource marginal prices. Our algorithm achieves optimal SFC allocation and pricing outcomes while guaranteeing bidding truthfulness, individual rationality, and polynomial-time complexity. Finally, we validate the online auction’s competitiveness through rigorous theoretical analysis and simulation studies driven by real-world traces.