Towards biometric template update protocols for cryptobiometric constructions

Biometric data have been stored remotely for authentication purposes. The crypto-biometric construction needs to update the biometric template periodically for security confirmation. However, the revocation of enrolled biometric data requires secure transmission of biometric data from the user to the server. We have analysed three existing schemes where users' biometric templates are stored in the remote server. In the first scheme, a cryptographic key is protected and shared with the biometric data. In the second approach, the biometric template is stored in the server's database and is used to exchange cryptographic keys. In the third scheme, a biometric template is stored and used to derive a permanent key that encrypts the session key and distributes it to the communicating party under a biometric-based key distribution centre. We have analysed the security of all the proposed protocols using the random oracle security model and proved that the protocols are secure against an attacker. We have compared our approaches with the existing approach and found that our third protocol has a minimum communication cost, that is 2,368 bits.