Beweist Wittgenstein Privatsprachenargument die Unmöglichkeit von Privatheit?

Wittgenstein’s private language argument is generally regarded as a refutation of privacy and thus as a refutation of a Cartesian model of personality, according to which there is an Ego that is immediately certain of itself. Wittgenstein specifically argues against the privacy of sensations, insofar as they are regarded as evidence of this immediacy. The aim of the article is to show that although Wittgenstein successfully refutes a Cartesian model of personality, this model is not simply replaced by linguistic generality and intersubjectivity; rather, it is paradoxically revitalized precisely through language. It is therefore not enough to regard this model and its implications – in particular the assumption of private objects – as ‘refuted’ by Wittgenstein, about which there seems to be a broad consensus in Wittgenstein research. One must also take into account the extent to which Cartesianism characterizes not only philosophical treatments of privacy, but also everyday thinking.