INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUMS AS AN INSTITUTION FOR MANAGING ETHNO-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS

One way of managing political-territorial heterogeneity within nation-states is to hold an independence referendum. This institution is characterized by its universality. However, their political, social, and economic consequences can vary from achieving full independence of a part of the territory to the aggravation of military conflicts. This study aims to identify how the political context in which decisions to hold independence referendums are made influences the outcome of a territorial conflict. Political context includes: peaceful/military conditions, consent of all actors to hold a referendum/unilateral plebiscite, and voting results. Using the theory of institutional isomorphism by P. DiMaggio and W. Powell, this paper identifies four typical contexts for holding independence referendums: 1) referendums in the context of military action; 2) unilateral referendums in the context of the existence of a de facto state; 3) unilateral referendums in peacetime; 4) referendums held within the framework of a conventional political process. Such plebiscites lead to a bloodless outcome if the following conditions are met: 1) both the separatists and the national center agree to hold a referendum; 2) the international community acts as an intermediary and recognizes the results of the vote; 3) the majority of citizens voted for independence and separation occurred.