Peer-to-peer network : Kantian cooperation discourages free riding

The problem of how to achieve cooperation among rational peers to discourage free riding is one that has received a lot of attention in peer-to-peer based web-communities and is still an important one. The field of game theory is applied to the task of finding solutions that will encourage cooperation while discouraging free-riding. The cooperative conduct of peers is typically portrayed as a traditional version of the game known as the “Prisoners’ Dilemma.” It is common knowledge that if two peers engage in a situation known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma more than once, collaboration can be achieved through the use of punishment. Nevertheless, this is not the case when there is only one interaction between peers. This article demonstrates that Kantian peers prefer to cooperate and attain social welfare even when they interact only once. The experimental results indicate that when Nashers engage in several interactions, their average payoff is negative. In contrast, when individuals adhering to the Kantian principles engage in repeated interactions, their payoffs exhibit both stability and social optimality. This, dissuade peers from freeriding.