Expect the Best, Prepare for the Worst? EU Council Anticipation of rule of law Challenges During the Hungarian Presidency

Abstract Research has solidly established that the presidency of the Council of the European Union can significantly influence the Council's activity. However, it has not yet explained whether, why and how Council actors anticipate the different national executives scheduled to lead them. I explore this gap through an extreme case: the Hungarian presidency (second semester 2024) and rule‐of‐law (RoL) enforcement. Findings reveal that anticipation exists, although it manifests informally, and is triggered by repeated consensus breaches. Trio arrangements, agenda shaping and issue linkage can help address topic exclusion but remain constrained by the presidency's decision‐making power and co‐ordination limits. Empirically, I trace anticipation using evidence from elite interviews with key actors. This work contributes to the RoL crisis literature by shifting the focus to how EU institutions anticipate, not react to, illiberal challenges, with implications for institutional resilience, mutual trust and the neutrality of the presidency.