Divided Government and Structural Tensions in Presidentialism : Toward Constitutional Reform

As the authority and status of the legislature continue to grow, situations where the president’s party fails to secure a parliamentary majority—resulting in divided government—are becoming more frequent. In such contexts, conflicts between the president and the legislature have intensified, at times leading to national crises. The United States presidential system is not immune to the challenges of divided government. Historically, the weak party discipline characteristic of U.S. political parties allowed presidents to secure legislative support through individual negotiations with opposition members. However, as political polarization has deepened, leading to intensified confrontations such as presidential impeachment efforts and federal government shutdowns. In Brazil, which operates a presidential system based on a multiparty structure, the ruling party typically forms a coalition government to overcome the challenges of not holding a majority. However, the large number of parties represented in the legislature often leads to discord among coalition partners. When coalition governance becomes unsustainable, opposition coalitions have at times pushed for presidential impeachment. To address the structural shortcomings of the presidential system, constitutional reform is necessary. In particular, the authority and institutional position of the prime minister must be strengthened. However, dividing power along a binary line—assigning the president to foreign affairs and national security and the prime minister to domestic governance—risks creating administrative confusion and blurring lines of responsibility and accountability. To resolve the challenges posed by divided government and enhance the stability of governance, the role of the prime minister must be redesigned. The prime minister, recommended by the National Assembly, should hold substantial powers and take the lead in areas such as budgeting, personnel appointments, and government legislation. In addition, the electoral cycle should be adjusted so that half of the members of parliament are elected every two years. This would enable the prime minister to serve as a key facilitator in coalition-building during periods of divided government.