Information foundations of state capacity: evidence from the imperial bureaucracy of China

Abstract Building a strong state requires ample information regarding civil societies; otherwise, central authorities lack the foundation to implement taxation schemes and mobilize the military. However, the information foundations of state capacity are under-researched by scholars. This paper studies a communication reform in the imperial bureaucracy of Qing China, which allowed certain local officials to report directly to the emperor, serving as informants. Leveraging the fact that the direct communication channel was unevenly introduced, this paper finds that government disaster assistance, a critical public good in pre-industrial societies, was significantly increased in prefectures where at least one informant was assigned, compared to those without informants. Furthermore, the increase in government assistance can be mainly attributed to improved information transmission and competitive information supply facilitated by direct communication within the bureaucracy. This research highlights the positive impact of a flattening and competitive information structure on the development of state capacity.