When the Servant Is Also Master: A Theory on the Dual Role of Public Managers

ABSTRACT Public managers at all levels of the political‐administrative hierarchy take on a dual role as both principal and agent simultaneously. Because of this dual role, it is relevant for public managers to maintain credibility with their agents and remain loyal to their principals. This article develops a theory arguing that public managers can approach their dual role in a given situation utilizing a strategy based on one of four ideal types: Squires prioritize loyalty, Chieftains prioritize credibility, Mavericks prioritize neither, while Diplomats prioritize both. The relative distribution of preferences and information among public managers, and their principals and agents determines the viability of utilizing each strategy in that situation. The article contributes with a theoretical framework that allows us to better understand and analyze the dual role of public managers. It also promotes a research agenda by outlining relevant situations to examine and potential implications of the theory.