The Concept of Categoricity

ABSTRACT Despite the fact that the concept of categoricity is ubiquitous in contemporary metaphysics, it is hard to find a suitable characterization of categoricity. I hold that the absence of such a characterization is responsible for much confusion and debate regarding categorical properties and their relationship to dispositions. With this in the background, this paper aims to make clear the intuitive ground for our concept of categoricity by taking cues from Locke's view of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The key thesis, which I call “the BIC proposal,” is that in case of paradigmatically categorical properties Q, the conscious content of our mental image of x's instantiating Q includes that x exhibits a certain distinctive manifestation actually or occurrently in the sense explained below. I believe that this is a promising formulation of the popular thought that x's instantiating a categorical property concerns what x actually or occurrently is like or does without any external stimuli. It is thus hoped to improve our understanding of categoricity and pave the way for more informed discussions about topics surrounding categorical properties.