On Drawing the Tensed-Tenseless Divide in Philosophy of Time in the Analytic Tradition

Abstract Since McTaggart’s seminal argument (McTaggart, J. M. E. 1908. “The Unreality of Time.” Mind 17 (68), McTaggart, J. M. E. 1927. The Nature of Existence, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), philosophers of time have been split within the tensed and tenseless camps. This division presumes that there are criteria in virtue of which philosophers of time have belonged to either camp. Yet, the criteria presented in time-related literature are frequently inaccurate. The paper addresses this issue by laying down what is common to all philosophers that since the publication of McTaggart’s argument have belonged to the tensed/tenseless camp, and in virtue of which they should be considering as belonging to this camp. It considers and rejects three ways in which the tensed-tenseless divide has frequently been characterised; in terms of shared views regarding the meaning or truth of tokens of tensed sentences, of whether one believes in passage or in terms of whether one believes in tensed facts. It finally suggests two criteria which adequately serve to mark the chasm-lines between the two camps.