Research on evolution game of low-carbon strategy of government, intelligent manufacturing enterprises, and consumers
Abstract With the aim of reducing businesses’ carbon emissions and encouraging low-carbon product purchasing behavior, an evolutionary game model involving government, intelligent manufacturing enterprises, and consumers is constructed, analyzes stability strategy, verifies the conclusion with numerical simulation, and analyzes the factors affecting the system’s evolution. The study indicates that the government’s acquisition of social welfare benefits and carbon tax revenue should exceed the costs associated with government supervision and subsidies provided to enterprises and consumers, ensuring the system’s single stable strategy. Carbon pricing mechanisms and low-carbon subsidies provided to enterprises and consumers influence the system’s evolution.
Authors
- L. Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-7137-4049)
- Rachel Chang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2337-098X)
- Bangtong Huang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6398-4292)
- Yu Han (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1462-1118)
- Qi Xu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9030-9065)
- Tianchen Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1526-6676)
Institutions
- Shanghai University of Engineering Science (CN)
- Donghua University (CN)
- Yunnan University of Finance And Economics (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies
- Published
- 2025-01-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlct/ctaf080
- Primary Topic
- Sustainable Industrial Ecology
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences