Kharkov Offensive Operation of the Soviet Troops of the Southwestern front on May 12-28 1942

Based on the study of archival documents, memoirs and scientific literature, this article examines the course of the offensive operation conducted by the troops of the Southwestern Front from May 12 to 28, 1942 in the Kharkov direction. The reasons for the failure and its consequences for the entire strategic situation on the Soviet-German front are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the review of the procedure for the use of various types of troops. The scale of the forces and means involved, as well as the number of losses incurred relative to the results achieved, is investigated. The author concludes that these events have once again convincingly demonstrated the need for an objective assessment of the evolving situation, a balanced correlation of one's capabilities with the enemy's forces, careful organization of interaction between all branches of the armed forces and stable communication, without which it is difficult to achieve serious success in modern warfare. The article notes that, despite the failure that befell the Red Army, a critical assessment of the results allowed the Soviet command to uncover the shortcomings and make changes to its tactics and strategy. A timely and objective study of the drawbacks, followed by practical application of the findings, contributed to improving the combat capability of the Russian Armed Forces. Another result that had a delayed effect was a significant loss of time allowed by the German command due to the need to restore the losses incurred and prepare for large-scale offensive operations during the summer and autumn of 1942. All this combined to ensure the future victories of the Red Army, including at Stalingrad.