Friendshoring as a challenge to international investment and economic law: from treaties to geopolitical discrimination

It has been established that friendshoring generates legal risks stemming from the conflict between geopolitically motivated restrictions and state obligations under bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The study reveals that the lack of a unified approach to dispute resolution exacerbates investor vulnerability, particularly in cases of indirect expropriation and discriminatory measures justified by national security concerns. The research concludes that friendshoring contradicts the principle of non-discrimination in international economic law, thereby undermining investment climate stability. Through case analyses (Rosneft v. Germany, EU sanctions against Russian assets, restrictions on Huawei in Australia, Tatneft v. Ukraine), the paper demonstrates a growing trend of expansive interpretations of “national security” and “public interest” as tools to circumvent BIT obligations. The study recommends enhancing precautionary measures for both investors and states to mitigate these risks.