What we can learn from the atypical employment of migrants in manufacturing: dual processes, screening practices, or institutional segmentation?

Abstract The article examines the drivers of migrant atypical employment in the manufacturing sector of Emilia-Romagna, an Italian region that is well known for its high-quality manufacturing productions and industrial relations. By drawing on administrative data based on mandatory communications, we document that, even in such an institutional context, migrants have a disproportionately higher likelihood of being hired through either fixed-term or agency contracts than native workers. We interpret this evidence through a set of different theories, including human capital theory, dual labour market processes, the use of precarious contracts as screening devices, and institutional segmentation theories. The empirical analysis reveals that while migrant employment through fixed-term contracts is consistent with dual processes and screening practices, the hiring of migrants with agency contracts is driven by processes of institutional segmentation, through which employers shift the costs of flexibility to the most vulnerable and less organized segments within the labour force, such as migrants. Managerial and policy implications are discussed.