La factibilidad del niño-máquina de Turing
According to the philosophers of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Turing Machines and theImitation Game are the most important concepts proposed by Alan Turing. The Child-Machine Project, which projects learning machines via digital computers, is less known, although it is noless important. According to Turing’s project, a programmed machine needs to be a Child-Machineto turn into an adult mind, one that understands, judges, and distinguishes. In this article, I argue that Turing’s desideratum is not realizable only with algorithms. In the first section, I introduce theproblem, while in the second I briefly analyze concepts such as algorithms, Turing Machines, and their relation. In the third section, I deal with Machine Intelligence and the Child-Machine Project.In the fourth section, I look at a form of understanding, which is the basis of the Chinese Room Argument: introspection and reflective thinking, two factors that enable the process by whichresults are revised. In the fifth section, I analyze why those processes of revision are the stumbling block of classical AI or GOFAI; as I argue, introspection and reflective thinking are the cognitivefaculties that prevent the child-machine from becoming a “thinking adult mind”.
Authors
- Rodrigo Alfonso González Fernández (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9693-0541)
Institutions
- University of Chile (CL)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Sophía
- Published
- 2025-07-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.17163/soph.n39.2025.03
- Primary Topic
- Philosophical Thought and Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Universidad Politécnica Salesiana del Ecuador