La factibilidad del niño-máquina de Turing

According to the philosophers of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Turing Machines and theImitation Game are the most important concepts proposed by Alan Turing. The Child-Machine Project, which projects learning machines via digital computers, is less known, although it is noless important. According to Turing’s project, a programmed machine needs to be a Child-Machineto turn into an adult mind, one that understands, judges, and distinguishes. In this article, I argue that Turing’s desideratum is not realizable only with algorithms. In the first section, I introduce theproblem, while in the second I briefly analyze concepts such as algorithms, Turing Machines, and their relation. In the third section, I deal with Machine Intelligence and the Child-Machine Project.In the fourth section, I look at a form of understanding, which is the basis of the Chinese Room Argument: introspection and reflective thinking, two factors that enable the process by whichresults are revised. In the fifth section, I analyze why those processes of revision are the stumbling block of classical AI or GOFAI; as I argue, introspection and reflective thinking are the cognitivefaculties that prevent the child-machine from becoming a “thinking adult mind”.

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Publication Details

Journal
Sophía
Published
2025-07-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.17163/soph.n39.2025.03
Primary Topic
Philosophical Thought and Analysis
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

La factibilidad del niño-máquina de Turing

Rodrigo Alfonso González Fernández
Sophía
Philosophical Thought and Analysis
article

La factibilidad del niño-máquina de Turing

Rodrigo Alfonso González Fernández
article en

Abstract

According to the philosophers of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Turing Machines and theImitation Game are the most important concepts proposed by Alan Turing. The Child-Machine Project, which projects learning machines via digital computers, is less known, although it is noless important. According to Turing’s project, a programmed machine needs to be a Child-Machineto turn into an adult mind, one that understands, judges, and distinguishes. In this article, I argue that Turing’s desideratum is not realizable only with algorithms. In the first section, I introduce theproblem, while in the second I briefly analyze concepts such as algorithms, Turing Machines, and their relation. In the third section, I deal with Machine Intelligence and the Child-Machine Project.In the fourth section, I look at a form of understanding, which is the basis of the Chinese Room Argument: introspection and reflective thinking, two factors that enable the process by whichresults are revised. In the fifth section, I analyze why those processes of revision are the stumbling block of classical AI or GOFAI; as I argue, introspection and reflective thinking are the cognitivefaculties that prevent the child-machine from becoming a “thinking adult mind”.

Sophía(39)
University of Chile (CL)
Universidad Politécnica Salesiana del Ecuador
Openalex Percentile: Top 74%
Philosophical Thought and Analysis
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La factibilidad del niño-máquina de Turing — Rodrigo Alfonso González Fernández · Sophía (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS