Enhancing Satellite Cybersecurity through FPGA-Based Secure Boot
As the complexity of modern computers, embedded devices, and satellites increases, so does the need for stronger cybersecurity. Government agencies are mandating cybersecurity measures for new space missions, which raises concerns among technology providers about the added complexity and cost of implementation, the potential impact on system performance, and the challenges of ensuring compliance with evolving regulatory standards. This paper discusses the growing necessity of incorporating Secure Boot to enhance satellite security. Secure Boot verifies the authenticity of an operating system or software before execution, starting with a root of trust that uses fixed keys and digital signatures for verification. While Secure Boot is commonly associated with the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) on consumer platforms, it is typically restricted to modern architectures. Space platforms often operate at their computational limits, and introducing Secure Boot could further reduce their processing capacity. However, leveraging a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to implement Secure Boot can offload the computational burden on the processor, minimizing the impact on overall system performance. Furthermore, applying Secure Boot enhances security by making the configuration tamperevident after initialization, effectively preventing unauthorized modifications during the boot process. This immutability reinforces the system's integrity, strengthens its defenses against tampering and malicious attacks, and minimizes the need for corrective measures in subsequent missions. Given these challenges, dedicating an FPGA core to Secure Boot provides an effective solution. As cybersecurity demands for satellites increase, accelerating Secure Boot via an FPGA core mitigates the performance impact while significantly bolstering security. This approach addresses the unique needs of space platforms and offers a robust response to the evolving challenges of satellite cybersecurity.
Authors
- Mark P. Johnson (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5078-1410)
- Patrick Saenz
- Nicholas P. Webb (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9355-5512)
Institutions
- Southwest Research Institute (US)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-03-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/aero63441.2025.11068623
- Primary Topic
- Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00