Observer-Based Event-Triggered Platoon Control for Connected Automated Vehicles Under FDI Attacks

The vehicle platoon control is a promising technology to increase urban transportation efficiency and to make big savings on fuel. However, in practical environments, due to the openness and non-confidentiality of the network, vehicle platoon may be vulnerable to false data injection (FDI) attacks, resulting in malicious tampering of data on the channel. If the abnormal factors brought by FDI attacks on vehicles are ignored, the stable operation and driving safety of the vehicle platoon may not be guaranteed. Considering this situation, an observer-based event-triggered control protocol combined with an anomaly detection algorithm, is proposed. This control protocol has the ability to detect anomalies and does not require real-time updates of state information, which can match scenarios where state information is not measurable. Secondly, the Lyapunov stability theory is applied to provide sufficient conditions for the stability of platoon systems, and the Schur’s complement lemma is applied to reduce the difficulty of solving controller parameters. Finally, the feasibility and superiority of this protocol is confirmed through co-simulation experiments and comparative experiments.