What is Provisional Possession?

Abstract The concept of provisional possession in Kant presents a significant interpretative challenge. Scholars agree that prior empirical possession must be rationalized but have struggled to identify a form of omnilaterality within the state of nature. I propose understanding provisionality through the Pure Concept of Understanding of Possession (PUP) – a unilateral yet normative framework that rationalizes empirical possession based on temporal priority. Possession understood through PUP serves as a precursor to intelligible possession within the state of nature. To support this account, I first demonstrate that intelligible possession starts from empirical possession, thereby requiring an explanation of the transition from the latter to the former. I then argue that provisional possession unfolds in two distinct steps: first, prior empirical possession acquires an empirical title through the postulate of practical reason, which confers normative significance on temporal priority; second, PUP abstracts from empirical conditions, facilitating the progression towards a rational title.