Judicial control over compliance with reasonable time limits in criminal proceedings: analysis of judicial practice

The article analyzes the institution of judicial control over compliance with reasonable terms in criminal proceedings as a key element of ensuring effective justice, access to justice and the implementation of the principle of a fair trial. The scientific views on the nature of violation of reasonable terms are investigated and a generalization of the main problems associated with the interpretation and application of this category in practice is proposed. The need for a detailed approach to determining reasonable terms is emphasized, since they may vary depending on the specific conditions of the case and circumstances. The role of the court in establishing the limits of reasonable terms and the possibility of their adjustment depending on the circumstances of the case is separately highlighted, as well as taking into account the behavior of the parties, the procedural activity of the defense or prosecution and the presence of proper reasons for delaying the consideration is determined. The leading approaches of the Supreme Court to assessing the reasonableness of the terms of criminal proceedings are identified on the example of specific court cases. Attention is drawn to the fact that the practice of the Supreme Court often forms legal positions that take into account both domestic and international standards, in particular the practice of the ECHR. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to ensure procedural balance between the parties and prevent excessive pressure on suspects or victims. The paper also provides an overview of the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights, which form uniform standards for assessing reasonable time limits and are actively taken into account by national courts when making decisions. The conclusions substantiate that the understanding of the concept of «reasonable time» is a complex and multifactorial phenomenon that is not amenable to universalization. Its assessment depends on both objective circumstances (complexity of the case, workload of the court, actions of the investigative bodies) and subjective factors (behavior of the participants in the process). In view of this, the author emphasizes the need for further in-depth research on this topic both in the context of the judicial practice of the Supreme Court and through the prism of European standards, in order to harmonize approaches and improve the quality of procedural legislation.