The Two of Disjunction or the Two That Makes One? Hegel and Badiou on Love

Abstract For both Hegel and Badiou, love is one vehicle through which the transition from substance to subject concretely occurs, despite their respective conceptions of this transition differing drastically. Although (amicably) critical of Hegel’s Logic , Badiou—the first systematic continental philosopher since Hegel—never expressly reproaches Hegel’s conception of love, as outlined in both the Logic and the Realphilosophie lectures, but it is not Hegelian love which Badiou champions. His possible criticisms of Hegelian love can only be discerned through his explicit critiques of the Logic, in which he faults Hegel’s denial of absolute difference. Given that Badiouian love is conceived precisely as the subjective experience of absolute difference, his critique of Hegel must play a more significant role in his conceptual rehabilitation of love than is immediately evident. This paper teases out Badiou’s critique of Hegel and examines what it illuminates regarding his conception of love, as well as Hegel’s. I conclude that Badiou’s conception highlights an aspect of Hegelian love which Hegel himself does not sufficiently emphasize, but it remains too one-sided on its own and thus forces one to continue to decide in favour of Hegel.