Rethinking Fingerprinting: An Assessment of Behavior-based Methods at Scale and Implications for Web Tracking

Most common forms of web tracking fail to maintain the continuity of a user's identity over long periods of time: cookies get deleted, IP addresses are reassigned, attributes used for browser fingerprinting change. These identity discontinuities help prevent adversaries from conducting persistent long-term tracking. In fact, many privacy-enhancing technologies (e.g., automatic cookie deletion, use of proxy servers, fingerprint obfuscation) are predicated on the ability of identity discontinuities to disrupt an adversary's tracking capability. While only evaluated on a limited scale, behavioral fingerprinting—identifying users based on habitual patterns in their web browsing—may provide adversaries the key to linking users' identities across these discontinuities. To assess this potential threat, we provide an analysis of behavioral fingerprinting at scale, with over 150,000 users across two years, and the first assessment of the impact of these techniques on user anonymity online. Overall, we find that behavioral fingerprints are relatively unique, with most browsing sessions retaining little to no anonymity even at scale. Furthermore, users' behavioral fingerprints are consistent, evolving slowly over the course of months to years. Together, these findings satisfy the preconditions for effective identity linking. We go on to demonstrate that optimal performance is achieved when an adversary can observe 15–25 browsing sessions prior to a discontinuity and 10–15 sessions after. However, an adversary can eliminate 84–95% of a user's anonymity having observed just a single session pre- and post-discontinuity. After a discontinuity occurs, a user loses an average of 78–85% of their anonymity within the first 60 seconds of browsing and 90% of their anonymity within the first 10 minutes—largely negating the anonymity gains of privacy protections that induce discontinuities. We find that visiting fewer web pages, diversifying the websites visited, and avoiding niche content can help a user's browsing remain anonymous. Finally, we demonstrate that the combination of behavioral and browser fingerprinting can outperform each method individually, achieving an F1 score of 0.869 across 100,000 users.

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Journal
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Published
2025-07-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2025-0158
Primary Topic
Stalking, Cyberstalking, and Harassment
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Rethinking Fingerprinting: An Assessment of Behavior-based Methods at Scale and Implications for Web Tracking

Kyle Crichton, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Nicolas Christin
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Stalking, Cyberstalking, and Harassment
article

Rethinking Fingerprinting: An Assessment of Behavior-based Methods at Scale and Implications for Web Tracking

Kyle Crichton, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Nicolas Christin
article en

Abstract

Most common forms of web tracking fail to maintain the continuity of a user's identity over long periods of time: cookies get deleted, IP addresses are reassigned, attributes used for browser fingerprinting change. These identity discontinuities help prevent adversaries from conducting persistent long-term tracking. In fact, many privacy-enhancing technologies (e.g., automatic cookie deletion, use of proxy servers, fingerprint obfuscation) are predicated on the ability of identity discontinuities to disrupt an adversary's tracking capability. While only evaluated on a limited scale, behavioral fingerprinting—identifying users based on habitual patterns in their web browsing—may provide adversaries the key to linking users' identities across these discontinuities. To assess this potential threat, we provide an analysis of behavioral fingerprinting at scale, with over 150,000 users across two years, and the first assessment of the impact of these techniques on user anonymity online. Overall, we find that behavioral fingerprints are relatively unique, with most browsing sessions retaining little to no anonymity even at scale. Furthermore, users' behavioral fingerprints are consistent, evolving slowly over the course of months to years. Together, these findings satisfy the preconditions for effective identity linking. We go on to demonstrate that optimal performance is achieved when an adversary can observe 15–25 browsing sessions prior to a discontinuity and 10–15 sessions after. However, an adversary can eliminate 84–95% of a user's anonymity having observed just a single session pre- and post-discontinuity. After a discontinuity occurs, a user loses an average of 78–85% of their anonymity within the first 60 seconds of browsing and 90% of their anonymity within the first 10 minutes—largely negating the anonymity gains of privacy protections that induce discontinuities. We find that visiting fewer web pages, diversifying the websites visited, and avoiding niche content can help a user's browsing remain anonymous. Finally, we demonstrate that the combination of behavioral and browser fingerprinting can outperform each method individually, achieving an F1 score of 0.869 across 100,000 users.

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing TechnologiesVol. 2025(4)
Georgetown University (US), Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 77%
Stalking, Cyberstalking, and Harassment
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