Reviewing the Extended Mind Theory: Theoretical Insights and the Role of Experimental Philosophy in Understanding Cognitive Boundaries

This study proposes a theoretical account of the evolution of the extended mind hypothesis by using experimental philosophy (x-phi) in the study of the concept of intrinsic content. Building on Clark's (1998) argument on behalf of extended cognition and Adams and Aizawa's (2001) neural-centric process argument, it considers how cognitive boundary judgments relying on intuition can illuminate the use of external devices, such as notebooks or mobile phones, in mental processes. The study concludes that x-phi's methods, which explore folk intuitions, offer a practical means of figuring out whether intrinsic content is contained in the brain or distributed across external systems. By considering factors like socioeconomic status that may affect intuitions, it highlights x-phi's ability to provide empirical insights to discussions in philosophy of mind (Knobe & Nichols, 2008). Drawing on inter-disciplinary methods across several disciplines (Yüksel, 2021), this research links philosophy and cognitive science and offers an addition to debates around 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive). The proposed method is aimed at making the theoretical and intuitive components of extended mind theory more transparent and providing a gateway towards future empirical investigations.