Intelligence as a style of reasoning

Scientific practices are characterized by a specific form of thinking or ‘style’ of reasoning, which predominate within that practice (Hacking, 2004a, 2004b). In this intervention, I discuss the intelligence style of reasoning. I argue that this style of thinking is based on a distinction between friends and enemies. It is, in other words, an adversarial style of reasoning. Within this general conceptual framework, the style of reasoning has a number of more specific features. First, secrecy is all-important in adversarial reasoning, since it is often essential both to keep information hidden from the adversary and to acquire information that the adversary would like to keep secret. Second, it makes it difficult, when assessing information, to draw a clear line between purely epistemic criteria and loyalty. When assessing a source's credibility, it is for instance important to know whether the source is an ally, a citizen, or an opponent, i.e. to locate the source on a scale from friend to foe. Third, the intelligence style of reasoning is based on the assumption that knowledge can be produced, not by an individual, but by a large, hierarchic organization, and more specifically that an epistemic process – learning or getting to know something – can be translated into or rendered as an organizational process. Fourth, at least in a modern Western context, the style of reasoning is also closely connected to an epistemic ideal of objectivity and truthfulness, given rise to the ideal fo speaking truth to power. In sum, the intelligence style of reasoning aims at objective, often secret knowledge produced by a large hierarchical organization and useful in an adversarial context. <br/><br/>Hacking, I. (2004a). Language, Truth, and Reason. In Historical ontology. London; Cambridge, Mass;: Harvard University Press.<br/>Hacking, I. (2004b). "Style" for Historians and Philosophers. In Historical ontology. London; Cambridge, Mass;: Harvard University Press.<br/><br/><br/>