Pengendalian Konflik Agensi dalam Tahapan Investasi pada Startup dengan Pendanaan Modal Ventura

This research aims to manage agency conflicts such as information asymmetry and moral hazard that occur during the pre-investment to post-investment phases. During the investment process, Venture Capital acts as the principal, while Startups act as the agents. This study employs a qualitative method with a case study approach. The research subjects consist of one (1) Startup in the financial technology (fintech) sector and two (2) Venture Capital firms, one owned by a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) and the other privately owned. The findings indicate that managing agency conflicts between Venture Capital and Startups requires comprehensive pre-investment assessments, including initial selection that covers financial and non-financial aspects, as well as contractual agreements involving a due diligence process. Meanwhile, post-investment management is carried out through performance monitoring, staged funding, and forming a Venture Capital Syndicate. Keywords: Agency Conflict; Moral Hazard; Information Asymmetry; Venture Capital; Startup.