From Epistemic States to Duties Not to Inquire?

Abstract Some philosophers consider knowledge the fundamental state whose presence or absence helps us decide when an inquiry is not permissible. Falbo has recently provided an alternative perspective in which epistemic improvement is what determines when an inquiry into a given question is not permitted: If it’s rational to be sure at t that, by inquiring, one won’t improve epistemically upon the question Q , then inquiry into Q is not permissible at t . In this paper, I will show that Falbo’s view is incorrect and that there are counterexamples to it. Moreover, based on this criticism, I will argue that our epistemic states do not generate a duty not to inquire. However, I will suggest they have a normative role for our inquiries: They provide reasons not to inquire. Finally, by discussing this point, I will claim that even if our epistemic states do not generate duties not to inquire, they can provide a “right not to inquire”. Nonetheless, I will conclude that there cannot be epistemic states that give an absolute right not to inquire, namely, a right that entitles one not to inquire no matter the circumstances one might find oneself in.