Afghanistan, Wargaming, and Human Behavior

This article seeks to show how our successes and overall strategic failing in Afghanistan – in particular, the swift takeover by Taliban forces despite two decades of nation-building and partnering – can be a teachable moment. Specifically, how a more realistic, grounded understanding of human nature and decision making, informed by concepts of human incentives, uncertainty, and risk, can assist us in certain warzones. This understanding may be critical in current and future conflicts where the (1) the formal governing system is ineffective, (2) said government tends to be unresponsive to the needs of lower-level leaders and the population, and (3) the culture lends itself to a stronger framework for localized self-governance and decision making. The author draws on existing military literature, local ABP/VSO outcomes, and insights into human nature and behavior. Broadly, the article fuses the following themes together in a way that is both academically sound and operationally feasible: Afghan culture and human behavior, bottom-up vs top-down governance, tribal engagement and village stability, US Military operational planning and risk assessment methodology (wargaming), and reconciling our approach with realities on the ground for future wars and conflicts.