Efficient Cpa Attack on Hardware Implementation of Ml-Dsa in Post-Quantum Root of Trust

Side-channel attacks (SCA) pose a significant threat to cryptographic implementations, including those designed to withstand the computational power of quantum computers. This paper introduces the first side-channel attack on an industrygrade post-quantum cryptography implementation. Specifically, we present a Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack targeting the open-source hardware implementation of ML-DSA within a Silicon Root of Trust framework developed through a multi-party collaboration involving leading technology companies. Our attack focuses on the modular reduction process that follows the Number Theoretic Transform-based polynomial pointwise multiplication. By exploiting side-channel leakage from a distinctive unique reduction algorithm and leveraging the zeroization mechanism used to securely erase sensitive information by clearing internal registers, we significantly enhance the attack's efficacy. Our findings reveal that an adversary can extract the secret keys using only 10,000 power traces. With access to these keys, an attacker could forge signatures for certificate generation, thereby compromising the integrity of the root of trust. This work highlights the vulnerabilities of industry-standard root-oftrust systems to side-channel attacks. It underscores the urgent need for robust countermeasures to secure commercially deployed systems against such threats.