At‐Least‐Potentially‐Non‐Contrastive Transcendence in Tanner's <i>God and Creation in Christian Theology</i>

Abstract Kathryn Tanner's God and Creation in Christian Theology is a foundational text in the expression of a 'non‐contrastive' Christian account of God and creation: that God is so fundamentally incommensurable with the world as not to be in a relation of contrast or competition, nor distant from it. In recent years, theologians have celebrated and drawn upon Tanner's work for its robust account of creaturely agency. While that is indeed found in her book, her primary emphasis is that God is not positioned or circumscribed by creation. Thus, while creaturely agency and freedom are compatible with divine agency and freedom, they are not enjoined, demanded, or necessary. Championing Tanner's non‐competitive account of the agency of creatures is valuable, but it will not reflect that book's argument if taken in isolation or elevated to first place. In concluding this essay, I argue that while the freedom and causal powers of creatures should be seen as more than a matter of divine whim, that is best argued in terms of suitability or fittingness, and not—as Tanner recognises—of necessity.