Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation and Extortion on Networks With Fitness-Dependent Rules

This study establishes a multi-agent modeling framework to analyze the evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies on regular networks under hybrid social dilemmas integrating Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift game. By formulating fitness-driven dynamical equations, theoretical and numerical results reveal that cooperators exhibit dominance in steady-state under pairwise comparison rules, whereas extortion strategies demonstrate significant invasion characteristics in scale-free networks under death-birth update rule. Notably, the influence of both temptation and extortion factors on cooperation evolution exhibits a pronounced rule-dependent phenomenon. By decoupling the multidimensional coupling effects of network topology, strategy update rule and payoff parameters, we establish critical criteria for cooperation evolution. These findings provide a dynamical theoretical basis for illustrating cooperation emergence mechanisms in complex social networks and designing intervention strategies to enhance collective cooperation.