Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Governance in Construction and Demolition Waste Management

Construction and demolition waste management remains a critical challenge in China, where low recycling rates and fragmented stakeholder coordination impede the transition toward a circular economy. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government regulators, construction enterprises, and recycling enterprises. By integrating replicator dynamics with MATLAB-based simulations and incorporating phased subsidies, penalties, and firm-level cost parameters, the model analyzes the strategic evolution of stakeholder behaviors. Simulation results show that a stable cooperative equilibrium emerges when subsidies for construction and recycling enterprises are set at E1 = 50 and E2 = 48, and the penalty H is at least 50. Under these conditions, the probability of adopting proactive strategies exceeds 0.9 within 50 iterations. While penalties remain consistently effective across all levels of market maturity, the marginal utility of subsidies declines sharply as the resource utilization rate (q) approaches 0.5. Increasing the initial cooperation probability of construction enterprises from 0.5 to 0.8 reduces convergence time by approximately 35%. High sorting costs (F > 45) and low resale revenues (I < 40) are identified as key barriers to sustained cooperation. Based on these findings, a three-phase policy strategy is proposed: subsidies should be deployed in the early stage to lower entry barriers; penalties should be prioritized during the transition phase; and transaction cost reduction and long-term revenue mechanisms should be emphasized in the mature stage. The study provides both theoretical and practical insights into sustainable governance of construction and demolition waste.