[Evolutionary Game of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Regional Synergistic Carbon Emission Reduction under Carbon Neutrality Target].

Cross regional cooperation on carbon emission reduction is an effective mechanism to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. This paper， based on evolutionary game theory， constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative carbon emission reduction in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei urban agglomeration， analyzing the evolution process of collaborative carbon emission reduction strategy selection between Beijing-Tianjin， Beijing-Hebei， and Tianjin-Hebei. The research results follow： ① The cost of collaborative carbon emission reduction is an important factor affecting the participation of Beijing， Tianjin， and Hebei in collaborative carbon emission reduction， and excessive cost can lead to the rupture of the collaborative carbon emission reduction relationship. ② Punishment has a certain moderating effect on maintaining a collaborative carbon emission reduction relationship. Increasing the opportunity cost of violating synergy helps both sides get out of the "prisoner's dilemma" and maintain the cooperative carbon emission reduction relationship， which is especially the case between Beijing and Tianjin. ③ The increase in the benefits of collaborative emission reduction is conducive to enhancing enthusiasm for collaborative carbon emission reduction in Beijing-Hebei and Tianjin-Hebei， ensuring the stability of the collaborative relationship. ④ The increase in emission reduction rate will be accompanied by the emergence of collaborative emission reduction fatigue， which should be given attention， especially between Tianjin and Hebei. Finally， targeted suggestions and measures are proposed to promote carbon emission reduction through collaborative cooperation between Beijing， Tianjin， and Hebei， providing a theoretical basis and decision-making support for collaborative governance between Beijing， Tianjin， and Hebei.