Heads in the Sand: Assessing the UK Government’s Failure to Foresee the Fall of the Afghan State

Abstract This article explores the UK experience in Afghanistan (2001–2021) to understand why British policymakers did not foresee the rapid collapse of the Afghan state in August 2021. Through interviews with foreign policy practitioners, it highlights the dissonance between the narratives and expectations of UK foreign policy towards Afghanistan and the reality of enacting it within the institutional culture and behaviour prevalent in decision-making circles. It finds that foreign policy formulation was unrealistic, policymakers failed to acknowledge how little agency the UK had in the UK/US relationship, tactical operations provided a false sense of progress towards strategic goals, and Afghan military effectiveness was almost wholly dependent on nato support. Compounding this, the British government’s Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy evacuated those vital to the future success of the Afghan state and created a perfect storm in which policymakers were unable to foresee the imminent crisis.