Sexuate Difference Beyond Identity

This article argues that Luce Irigaray’s ontology of sexuate difference must be understood as a relational ontology, while situating this interpretation within a broader context of debates about social constructionism, essentialism, and identity. I explore how Irigaray’s inheritance of Heideggerian thought and her development of a relational ontology allows her to circumvent some of the problems created by the frequent tendency in feminist theory to focus on defining what women “are.” By proposing that Being gives itself to us as relation—simultaneously announcing difference while calling upon us to develop a more ethical relationship between subjects—I argue that Irigaray goes beyond both Heideggerian thinking and more positivistic nature/culture debates that rely on Cartesian dualism for their framing. I also further develop my own concept of “relational limit” to illustrate how a relational ontology of difference can help us to respond to modern challenges raised by identity politics.