Trade and Scientific and Technical Co-operation with the USA on the Agenda of the USSR Leadership in the Years of Détente, 1969–1982

In the structure of the Soviet-American détente in the 1970s, issues of trade and cooperation in the field of science and technology occupied an important place. By the end of the 1960s, strategic parity had been achieved in the confrontation between the United States and the USSR. The arms race was perceived as a costly and unpromising venture. On the one hand, the temporary balance of military potential led to a decrease in direct confrontation and a reduction in the threat of war. On the other hand, it contributed to the spread of beliefs that intensified commercial ties, and the development of scientific and technological programmes would create a material basis for lasting peace. In Moscow, this idea acquired the status of a directive. In 1968, the director of the US Institute G. Arbatov drew the attention of the country’s leadership to the significant technological gap between the USSR and the United States, where the latest scientific discoveries were quickly introduced into the production of consumer goods, whereas in the USSR, the achievements of scientific and technological revolution were mainly available to the military-industrial complex. In 1971, the priority of introducing the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution into the production of consumer goods was fixed by the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU. However, a year later, despite the opinions of experts from the academic community, this strategy began to be adjusted in favour of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Based on the available historiographical heritage and documents of the Russian archives (Russian State Archive of Modern History, Russian State Archive of Economics), memoir sources, as well as documents of the American intelligence services, the State Department and the US Congress, the article shows how approaches to shaping policy towards the United States changed in Moscow during the 1970s, and what place was given in this policy to trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The conclusions substantiate the fact that initially, the focus on the scientific and technological revolution was important for L. Brezhnev and his supporters in the Soviet leadership. The achievement of the strategic goals of the USSR, namely, the improvement of the standards of living, consumer culture and people’s quality of life, creating a more attractive image of socialism – depended on how the country could technologically integrate into the new conditions. In this context, G. Arbatov, N. Inozemtsev, and their colleagues presented their recommendations. However, due to the “fading” of the superpowers’ détente between the late 1970s and early 1980s, their ideas were less in demand.