Green Paradox in the Carbon Neutrality Process: A Strategic Game About the Shipping Industry

The shipping industry plays a significant role in China’s and the global pursuit of carbon neutrality, and it is essential to be cautious about the potential risks associated with the green paradox. This study incorporates Goal Setting Theory and Value Expectations Theory into the analytical framework of the green paradox and tests this framework through a strategic game research design. The study finds that, first, the green paradox of shipping companies presents hidden characteristics, and the loss caused by coping strategies is a necessary risk to be vigilant about. Second, the green paradox of shipping companies is mainly caused by the decision-makers’ goal perception of accessibility. Moreover, due to the motivation of long-term acceptance of green subsidies, decision-makers will delay the carbon neutrality process. Third, policies need to adopt a gradient increasing quota management strategy, and be accompanied by a variety of policy tools to reduce the risk of the green paradox. This study opens the theoretical “black box” of market expectations and provides a solution to reduce the risk of the green paradox.