Shaming Paris: A Political Economy of Climate Commitments

Abstract We use a formal model to explore leaders’ incentives to set climate commitments and subsequently exert downstream mitigation effort. Since the Paris Agreement asks countries to make unilateral voluntary commitments, we investigate the domestic factors motivating climate pledges. We study a country with electoral competition between two parties, Green and Brown, who first make commitments to reduce emissions and then implement policies to meet their commitments. Voters anticipate the equilibrium policies each party will implement given the pledge. If downstream mitigation policies are insufficient relative to the commitment, the government is “shamed” by the international community. Several incentive channels arise when parties make commitments, as they have policy and electoral value. Parties can use commitments to tie the opposition’s hands to implement preferential policies in the future. If parties care only about winning elections, they will exploit commitments to serve electoral needs, which paradoxically leads anti-environmental parties to implement more ambitious commitments.