Obligations and Permissions, and Conflicting Norms

ABSTRACT This article engages with the problem faced by deontic logic in dealing with conflicting norms, taking the issue back to the representation of the logical relations between deontic operators in a square of opposition. Reaction to empirical evidence of conflicting obligations has produced a rejection of the relations depicted in the sides of a square of opposition, while leaving the diagonal contradictories forming a deontic X structure. It is argued, first, that the contradictory relations between obligation and permission are a prerequisite for any deontic logic. Secondly, that the deontic X structure is not plausible without the supporting relations in the sides of the deontic square. Thirdly, that the conundrum of the apparent incompatibility between the contrary and subaltern relations found in the square, and the empirical evidence of conflicting obligations in actual systems of norms, can be resolved by taking deontic logic as applying primarily to individual norms and only as a secondary matter being involved with identifying conflicts between norms. This produces both a more effective approach to deontic logic, capable of dealing with conflicting norms, and also a more modest approach, in acknowledging its inability to prevent or resolve conflict between norms.