Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules

We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the computational complexity of deciding how many such operations are necessary to change the set of winning committees. We also consider the counting variants of our problems, which can be interpreted as computing the probability that the result of an election changes after a given number of random perturbations of the given election.

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Publication Details

Journal
Review of Economic Design
Published
2025-06-30
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-025-00385-1
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
3.13

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article

Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules

Piotr Faliszewski, Bartosz Kusek, Grzegorz Gawron
1 citations
Review of Economic Design
Game Theory and Voting Systems
3.13
article

Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules

Piotr Faliszewski, Bartosz Kusek, Grzegorz Gawron
article en
1 citations

Abstract

We investigate how robust approval-based multiwinner voting rules are to small perturbations in the votes. In particular, we consider the extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the computational complexity of deciding how many such operations are necessary to change the set of winning committees. We also consider the counting variants of our problems, which can be interpreted as computing the probability that the result of an election changes after a given number of random perturbations of the given election.

Review of Economic Design
AGH University of Krakow (PL)
European Commission, Akademia Górniczo-Hutnicza im. Stanislawa Staszica, H2020 European Research Council
Openalex Percentile: Top 8%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
3.13
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Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules — Piotr Faliszewski, Bartosz Kusek, et al. · Review of Economic Design (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS