Metaethical internalism: De dicto and de re formulations

The well-known medieval distinction between de re and de dicto plays a significant role in a wide range of contemporary philosophical debates. In the domain of practical philosophy, this distinction has, over the past two decades, most frequently been associated with the position of internalist cognitivism-that is, the metaethical view according to which moral beliefs instantiate some form of necessary relation to conative or inherently motivating psychological states. The primary aim of this paper is to provide a detailed account of the historical context, philosophical implications, and the arguments used both to defend and to critique traditional de re versions of internalist cognitivism, as well as contemporary de dicto formulations of this metaethical position. In short, the paper aims to offer a well-grounded theoretical basis for a reasoned answer to the question of whether the internalist thesis can still be defended in its original de re form, or whether the necessity between moral beliefs and conations should instead be interpreted in line with the more recent de dicto approach.