The Disintegration of the USSR and the Fate of the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal

Mariana Budjeryn, Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2022. 328 pp. $34.95.Editor's Introduction: Mariana Budjeryn's book Inheriting the Bomb provides an in-depth analysis of the domestic and international political context of the decision by Ukraine in the first half of the 1990s to relinquish the Soviet nuclear forces that were left on its territory after the breakup of the USSR in late 1991. That decision came only after a good deal of debate within Ukraine and extensive bargaining with foreign powers, but in many respects it was less controversial at the time than it became in later years, especially after Russia's military incursions into Ukraine in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion that began in February 2022. Budjeryn's book not only contains rich historical detail based on a wide array of primary sources but also broaches questions that are of great relevance in judging Russia's prolonged war against Ukraine and possible ways of ending it permanently (especially the importance of meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine, unlike the “assurances” in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994). We asked three leading experts to write appraisals of the book. This book forum includes their commentaries along with a reply by Budjeryn.In 1991, the Soviet Union, torn apart by a host of internal contradictions, collapsed, leaving behind some 30,000 Soviet nuclear warheads—the world's largest arsenal—scattered across several newly independent states. This circumstance posed one of the biggest challenges the nuclear non-proliferation regime has faced: how to avoid an increase in the number of nuclear powers. From 1991 through 1994, the U.S. government attached extremely high priority to ensuring that the demise of the Soviet Union did not produce a net increase in the number of nuclear weapons states.In Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine, Mariana Budjeryn does a superb job documenting how the denuclearization process proceeded in Ukraine, including by drawing on archival materials and interviews with key players. I read the book with great interest, having taken part in the negotiations in 1993–1994 to denuclearize Ukraine as a U.S. diplomat and later, as a scholar at the Brookings Institution, writing my own account of Ukraine's denuclearization (The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons). Budjeryn offers a more comprehensive narrative, rich in detail regarding the considerations and debates that took place in Kyiv.On paper, there was ample reason to believe that Ukraine intended to be a nuclear-weapons-free state. In July 1990, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic's Verkhovna Rada (parliament) adopted a Declaration on State Sovereignty by a near-unanimous vote. Section IX of that declaration committed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to non-nuclear status, though, as Budjeryn notes, that decision was made with little in the way of serious discussion. In October 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union an increasingly looming prospect, the Verkhovna Rada reaffirmed its position on Ukraine's non-nuclear status.The more than 4,500 nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory at the end of 1991 amounted to the world's third-largest arsenal. By May 1992, the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons had been removed to Russia in a process not fully coordinated with Ukrainian authorities. That left some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads, 176 SS-19 and SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 44 strategic bombers, and hundreds of air-launched cruise missiles. After the experience with non-strategic nuclear weapons, Kyiv made clear that it would have a say in the disposition of both the strategic warheads and their delivery systems.From the perspective of U.S. diplomats, inducing Ukraine to get rid of those weapons required answering four questions to the satisfaction of Ukrainian officials. First, nuclear weapons conferred certain security benefits; what guarantees or assurances might there be for Ukraine after the nuclear weapons were gone?Second, the strategic nuclear warheads had commercial value. They contained highly enriched uranium, which could be blended down into low-enriched uranium and made into fuel rods for nuclear reactors. What arrangements would ensure that Ukraine realized this value?Third, the elimination of the ICBMs, ICBM silos, strategic bombers, and other nuclear weapons infrastructure would be expensive. Given the uncertainties facing the Ukrainian economy, how would those costs be covered?Fourth, where—in Ukraine or somewhere else—and under what conditions would the nuclear warheads and their delivery systems be eliminated?Finding the answers to these questions was no easy task. From 1992 until September 1993, negotiations took place primarily in bilateral Ukrainian–Russian channels, with U.S. officials in contact with both sides about how the United States might assist (e.g., by joining in the provision of security assurances to Ukraine). However, after a summit meeting between Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin in early September 1993 failed to resolve the fate of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the U.S. government concluded that it needed to engage more directly in what became a trilateral Ukrainian-Russian-U.S. negotiation.In January 1994, the trilateral negotiation produced the Trilateral Statement, which laid out the answers to the four questions. It set the terms for Ukraine to transfer the strategic nuclear warheads to Russia for elimination and U.S. and Russian commitments to facilitate the process. Ukraine would receive compensation from Russia for the value of the highly enriched uranium in the of fuel rods an of low-enriched uranium the The United States would through the for the elimination of the ICBMs, ICBM silos, and strategic in Ukraine. the Trilateral contained the security assurances that Ukraine would receive from the United and the United States it had to the as a non-nuclear at a summit of the for and in in Ukraine its of to the and the of Ukraine, the United and the United States the Budapest Memorandum of for Ukraine. By the strategic warheads had left Ukraine and in Russia for the terms of the 1991 and the 1992 under which and Ukraine to out the Soviet I and Ukraine the strategic delivery systems on their territory by how regarding their nuclear the three from the end of the Soviet Union through the at the Budapest In 1992, not Ukraine's to a of nuclear weapons, Verkhovna Rada about Ukraine's of the nuclear on its and the that Ukraine had the of of of those nuclear The Verkhovna Rada that Ukraine would for some as a nuclear However, as Budjeryn the international made no for that or status.The Ukrainian position was to Russian officials. They took the as as the was there were only of nuclear weapons which in the context the United and the United States, and non-nuclear weapons states. That left no for Ukrainian of the weapons or as a nuclear officials to the that it to and debate between Ukrainian and Russian officials. However, did clear the U.S. that Ukraine had a to the commercial value of the highly enriched uranium in the The U.S. position on warheads from that on the and strategic U.S. officials the delivery systems as were directly with Kyiv on for their and no the Ukrainian government to transfer some SS-19 and strategic to Russia in for to the of were the questions of and and of of the nuclear in Ukraine. Budjeryn into these from those by U.S. officials in the early that and for an to the in Ukraine in Russia and the Ukrainian would have to a for about a decision to nuclear weapons, that would not to the for a that Kravchuk asked Ukrainian to a to a but that Kravchuk had more than a but that on the of the and to Kravchuk after from with U.S. diplomats, Ukrainian officials the arrangements in They in to a from Russian Kravchuk had to an They an from the Ukrainian based in Ukraine would not be with the of ICBM warheads and warheads that had been removed from air-launched cruise missiles to be by strategic bombers, as as warheads in as to on in Budjeryn that the of the of the in Russia's of nuclear weapons, the for those this was what U.S. State officials However, in 1993, their Ukrainian that military in Ukraine had taken to Ukraine in 1992 for those in the Russian which had extensive and other in but to with strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine. The Ukrainian officials that the for nuclear warheads were by Ukrainian military In I had with Russian military in and September that this had been the the warheads had been in the of Ukrainian They that had that their Ukrainian would regarding the nuclear warheads, in part of that had the Ukrainian and Russian in the Budjeryn that in Ukraine did not the to Ukraine until February I not what to of these the in between Ukraine's and the Verkhovna that were to U.S. in a February 1993 the that Ukraine the nuclear warheads and delivery a in the of and position that Ukraine key of the infrastructure needed to an independent nuclear weapons However, in the Verkhovna Rada that the was not Ukrainian on of nuclear weapons, for were more in the Verkhovna Rada than by Ukrainian to their U.S. Verkhovna Rada for out the which Ukraine nuclear weapons Ukraine's in 1992 to strategic delivery that the Ukrainian military on to the more SS-24 ICBMs, which had been in Ukraine, and with In 1993, to of I and the the Verkhovna Rada attached many conditions that and both it as a between the and to a was there between the with the and to the Verkhovna This would not have been an for Kyiv to in its to for its decision to nuclear I to the from a Ukrainian in a but early Russian and Russian security and military forces in in Ukraine's In February the Russian military an invasion of Ukraine. Russian commitments that had made in the Budapest Memorandum and in the on and as as in the and the That has to in Ukraine about the decision to nuclear in the 1990s was Budjeryn Ukraine had to the and a part of its nuclear it would not be the it but with nuclear a to nuclear would have a host of in the 1990s that a strategic with the United States, a with the bilateral with key U.S. and and U.S. and for to Ukraine from the and for and Ukraine the infrastructure to a nuclear and would have needed Russian would have had to as in a nuclear fuel to the to an independent nuclear at a time Ukraine's had what into a and Ukrainian officials failed in 1993–1994 to what Russia would in 2014 and 2022. Budjeryn the in Kyiv about how to deal with its but interviews and did not in the early 1990s that Russia would a war against Ukraine. the for nuclear weapons more on the United States than it to say had there been a serious in Kyiv that Russia might one the process of Ukraine's denuclearization could have out Budjeryn's book on how the newly Ukrainian nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union in 1991 and of The Ukrainian decision to its nuclear from a of internal with the of (especially from the United States and and the of the Nuclear to the that has the could Ukraine have nuclear weapons on its territory after the collapse of the This has been in several other and many a of I in Ukraine's Nuclear a Budjeryn's Inheriting the Bomb the comprehensive and of Ukraine's and internal political on its to a fully of the international the early part of the Budjeryn the of the Soviet Union and the from the failed 1991 by the State on the State of against the three of the the Soviet nuclear was Budjeryn out that the of the the Soviet and the demise of the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were on the territory of several of the newly independent that the of the that produced missiles to Soviet nuclear warheads, Ukraine had been a key part of the Soviet nuclear weapons infrastructure In this there was an in Ukrainian nuclear weapons in the many in Ukraine with the of the nuclear which the in Ukraine. considerations also a in Ukraine that the in the international would on the of which many as the only of leaving the USSR the to the on of States in of from Ukraine was a of the Soviet Union with to the Soviet by The U.S. government Russia's position on this the of the nuclear weapons as the of the of the In U.S. officials not it to on of with nuclear weapons and Ukraine from its Soviet nuclear the for this was an of the high value of nuclear weapons as a of foreign Ukraine of the nuclear warheads, the as the of the largest missiles for the warheads was a of nuclear weapons in Ukraine were of for Russia foreign of that could these were that the weapons could be by Ukraine against Russia Budjeryn the of by the Russian but it not clear that in Ukraine had been with the Soviet Union to the of the Russian from 1992 to Russian nuclear forces were not fully with until was not for forces in Ukraine at that the that did not have did have Russian military officials could not be certain about which were to weapons from Ukraine to Russian the Ukrainian government the Russian officials that on Ukrainian be at their of this the at and in 1991, Ukraine had to transfer nuclear to Russia by May However, in February 1992, Ukrainian Leonid Kravchuk the to be Budjeryn that this was by the between Russia and Ukraine the and Russia's to to as its own territory it that these a key other also have been Kravchuk was in the of Ukraine's own nuclear to receive U.S. for the of a nuclear on Ukrainian territory could have a possible way to the weapons U.S. that Kravchuk was in January 1992 Russian Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed under the Nuclear in September 1991. Yeltsin failed to the Ukrainian this and was to Russia say what would with the nuclear weapons based in out that Kravchuk and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) the the Ukrainian of which at that time was under Russia's was to the weapons to Russia Ukrainian to the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons on Ukrainian there was no that in However, some Ukrainian officials and these weapons for several the of the in the that strategic nuclear weapons based in Ukraine, the territory with security than it could Russian officials at the time were their to of and were also the Ukrainian that their nuclear would only in for meaningful security guarantees from key international players. by was Ukraine's strategic which was the in the The and the which with the other infrastructure as the the produced of Soviet strategic nuclear including those with that could to nuclear were in of with the which had ample to under the first in July 1991. the to the 1991 was by the Russian government to to the Ukrainian Russia's on Ukraine. in this became clear in 1992 of the were and In the in January 1993, Russia's from missiles This a to Ukrainian and the for Ukraine to nuclear weapons with the missiles that the nuclear The Ukrainian government had to to an to ensure the of Ukraine's joining the to facilitate of missiles to Budjeryn by the United States and Russia a in decision to relinquish the nuclear missiles. U.S. officials to have only one nuclear to the USSR and as the to this after the the part of this Russian the Soviet nuclear after the of the USSR The of the regime also the for nuclear and for The did not Ukraine to of nuclear weapons and only of the the it not that Ukraine the nuclear weapons on its but the does not for of nuclear Budjeryn that Russia's war against Ukraine would have been or would not have at Russia did not have nuclear weapons, which it with nuclear as a of in Ukraine. between Russia and would have the nuclear Russian officials nuclear to to other out of the and the nuclear context had the U.S. government to at the that it would not U.S. to Ukraine. Russian of the in this reason of nuclear some the on nuclear war at costs made the of on nuclear more for U.S. own in this Budjeryn's book and it not only for experts in the but also for a in and how Ukraine the nuclear weapons left on its territory after Budjeryn's Inheriting the Bomb a to the number of nuclear The book the first account of Ukraine's experience with nuclear the Soviet Union in the early 30,000 nuclear weapons in four newly the Russian and offers a account and how Ukrainian to nuclear weapons the on its at In great the leading to of non-proliferation by to the on the of Nuclear The book on a and its on the nuclear and international more rich detail Ukraine's nuclear and and by an and Budjeryn, a in the on the based at the for and not only provides a great deal of from and but also offers and The many interviews with key and the includes to has for to to the historical of nuclear in the early 1990s and to into nuclear and international more in both this Budjeryn with the in Nuclear and a Nuclear The first half the end of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian and the on Kyiv it has to be that the had the nuclear weapons, did to Budjeryn to out that the three nuclear of and Ukraine into a analysis their and In a that many and with for Ukrainian the of the Ukrainian in its Budjeryn and in the Bomb the at the the end of the Soviet Union with the of newly independent in Ukraine, and the Russian The first four the of the Soviet Union and how newly independent Ukraine the world's third-largest nuclear weapons and nuclear In this it to uranium and produce not to the of nuclear left behind by the Russian Budjeryn after had to what to with the nuclear left on their it this debate and at and a good deal of with Russia and the of the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian did these weapons the of Soviet states. What could in to the Soviet nuclear to which the answers and context to these the especially in its the on the and its This at the of the Soviet at for the three other than Ukraine, and it would have on with Russia as of the how of their would be in or nuclear Russia and the United States were in on the that the three not nuclear not for the time would the political by the in which to U.S. that these might end in the The international to what newly independent Ukrainian would with the nuclear left on their to these weapons and to a only with by the international especially by the of in but also by in to against domestic forces the negotiations Ukraine were set against the international the which was to under in Budjeryn how in independent to the an the United States, under to how Budjeryn to out of the The to that Ukraine's less than to nuclear In the position of its only Ukrainian officials were committed to but the context became by for security assurances and Ukraine's the of importance in the between from and This to to questions as nuclear and by Kyiv but by to a by for nuclear by early 1993 as the and of Ukraine's nuclear Ukraine was the and of the USSR and had the to the Soviet nuclear but and out in this for domestic which in into of how to nuclear in a way that would security assurances in for The was that nuclear a to a political and a of this the in to Ukrainian nuclear was in time did the of more with the of the of Ukraine to the as a non-nuclear weapons Ukrainian did not the nuclear as in their strategic and to the in After negotiations and Russian Kyiv the nuclear and a of to Budjeryn's a great deal more about this newly independent in its and also a of the but of its nuclear the of the the a analysis and of the newly independent Ukrainian at U.S. to its own This at security guarantees from It not that Ukraine these negotiations was with a domestic and was to foreign to its Ukrainian were fully that by to the nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, into the nuclear and it that Budjeryn's of key could have been a more made more This for regarding the Ukrainian to which Budjeryn including with Russia by to the of and the of Budjeryn had these considerations at it would have to the nuclear This the for the book to facilitate in the of the book what I as a that and Ukrainian to and not to the nuclear weapons on their a great deal the of their with It no Ukraine's Russia in 1992, Kyiv the nuclear of the three states. This for as and what a and that on a of the It a but book that both for one for deal with nuclear non-proliferation on a a great deal about Ukrainian the against which the and the Budapest Memorandum were the of what in with a full-scale Russian invasion in February were at the end of the Budjeryn that the Budapest security by the United States, the United and Russia of the of a possible of these negotiations between U.S. their Russian the little that was from a Ukrainian security to be a Russia's military and of in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February for to that security commitments under the as in the Budapest Memorandum did not in than a part of the security the Budapest Memorandum out to be a that later as domestic in Ukraine Inheriting the Bomb more with Ukraine's nuclear than other I of by Budjeryn The book its of for the nuclear and book offers an account of and that had a on adopted by Ukrainian in the early Budjeryn of Ukraine's and political more than other to on the It be a to on the and nuclear foreign U.S. and nuclear in Budjeryn to possible that a narrative, in which Kyiv would be it had the nuclear Budjeryn that job of that the to its security be nuclear weapons and the was by in a the of the the that Ukraine's in for what later to be security This on the which the international the as Budjeryn of the nuclear weapons on their territory to what and and against the of international and a The the had its Ukraine, and into the regime has commentaries on my book Inheriting the Bomb by and a and with my for which I The are in their of the book and its to the of Ukraine and its nuclear after the Soviet collapse and to nuclear more They also of and in for which I also and not fully some and are the and of strategic nuclear forces in the Soviet Union and how it and after the of the the of nuclear warheads Ukraine was to after its in 1991 and were to Russia in in 1993–1994 with the for Russia and the States at the U.S. of State on Ukraine and later an account of nuclear negotiations with Ukraine, that my analysis from the by U.S. officials in later on first the the that the of of Ukraine, and to about a Ukraine's Leonid Kravchuk on having the to the of a nuclear from Ukraine's I that Kravchuk had only a the from that primarily on the of the of the Ukrainian officials in a way from in to a from Kravchuk had to an which intercontinental ballistic missiles based in Ukraine could not be the I write on Leonid and the of the a which the could not out by This to the of which by the Ukrainian would a not of Kravchuk did not have to the the nuclear which required the to a key in a to and the the Russian was in of the and the and only had the to a nuclear from Ukraine's The of the on the of the in Ukraine, and to out a Russian the Ukrainian notes, there was no reason to that the of Ukraine's was to a it was to the in a of the of nuclear warheads in Ukraine after 1991. In the I that nuclear were in Ukrainian but the three at and under the of from Ukrainian officials in 1993 that nuclear were under Ukrainian on this In the book The of Ukraine which I only after my book to of the at one of of ICBM in Ukraine, that were to Ukraine's in military the were under the to the of the of first of the USSR Russian from 1992, on the territory of Ukraine were into the of were to the for a certain the newly for of the Nuclear in Ukraine and under the of the to for this which be in of Inheriting the The that Ukraine had of the nuclear warheads to one of the of the Ukraine had more in nuclear than has been the the of did not the and that Ukrainian nuclear has a that includes an account of Ukraine's nuclear possible in my I that nuclear weapons in the USSR and the United States were with security to to a book by of the that were not fully on until This the in Ukraine were with with for Ukraine's to and for with of strategic warheads, the of on Ukrainian this was the would have made little for the Ukrainian decision of to nuclear the decision to and the nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory would have had to be by the to and after the end of their nuclear fuel which Ukraine did not would have been key to this this in Ukraine's nuclear it to uranium and produce It not clear what has in but it to that Ukraine did not does not uranium and as I in the book. In uranium and Ukraine of the nuclear fuel as as the not the This was one of the to the the and for a nuclear weapons to Ukraine's nuclear into a and Ukraine's in this did not a for a uranium on to a of that the of the book and the relevance of Ukraine's nuclear for are not the book as a historical narrative, than a political and the of the of Ukraine's to the and a other the book. It also that from a In this the of and in their own also of for and with Ukraine's nuclear and a for a analysis of of nuclear there also the of nuclear about which an the which in my book in only a It would have been to in about of and between the of Ukraine and three that the book the comprehensive account of Ukraine's nuclear to Ukraine's nuclear in great that might be the that my account of Ukraine's nuclear from and military of Ukraine's nuclear and between Ukrainian and Russian in those early are especially and in of to of Ukraine's of which I was to would be in this task. my for the with the international political under which it became to in Ukraine's nuclear and military and by other