Are Pain-Beliefs Gettier Proof?

In ‘The Case of Patient Smith: Pain-Belief, Epistemic Luck, and Acquaintance,’ Elliott Crozat challenged the infallibility of the belief that “I feel pain” by providing a Gettier-type example that shows that such a pain-belief can be fallibly justified and luckily true. We claim that this move is problematic given that the case is not the Gettier sort. To demonstrate this, we first question the causal relation or lack thereof between the subject’s pain-belief and the pain he felt. We argue that this leads us to a dilemma. Either the painbelief and the pain are causally connected or not. If there is a causal connection, the subject’s true belief is justified, not epistemically lucky, and therefore qualifies as knowledge. If we grant no causal connection, we show that this leads to either an unjustified pain-belief or a justified false one. The result of both horns shows that Crozat’s Gettier-type example does not qualify as a bona fide Gettier case.