The Institutional Evolution of the US Financial System 1945–2023: Policy Implications of the Long-Wave Financial Cycle and Thwarting System Asymmetries

This article examines institutional and structural changes in the US financial system that contributed to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, suggesting a policy perspective for effective thwarting mechanisms. Building on Ferri and Minsky’s 1992 work, we explore how dynamic interactions between financial intermediaries and regulatory systems created systemic vulnerabilities. As thwarting mechanisms erode, they become asymmetric—curbing downturns but failing to deter excessive risk-taking. These asymmetries, alongside changes in expectations and risk appetite, drive financial activity outside regulatory oversight, exacerbating instability. The article emphasizes the need for adaptive, evolving regulatory frameworks to contain endogenous tendencies toward instability. While post-crisis reforms improved stability by addressing leverage, capital, and shadow banking, static aspects of the framework risk future erosion, as agent behavior adapts to extended periods of stability. JEL Classification: B52, G01, G28

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Review of Radical Political Economics
Published
2025-06-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/04866134251343364
Primary Topic
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

The Institutional Evolution of the US Financial System 1945–2023: Policy Implications of the Long-Wave Financial Cycle and Thwarting System Asymmetries

Yeo Hyub Yoon, Shaun K. Brog
Review of Radical Political Economics
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
article

The Institutional Evolution of the US Financial System 1945–2023: Policy Implications of the Long-Wave Financial Cycle and Thwarting System Asymmetries

Yeo Hyub Yoon, Shaun K. Brog
article en

Abstract

This article examines institutional and structural changes in the US financial system that contributed to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, suggesting a policy perspective for effective thwarting mechanisms. Building on Ferri and Minsky’s 1992 work, we explore how dynamic interactions between financial intermediaries and regulatory systems created systemic vulnerabilities. As thwarting mechanisms erode, they become asymmetric—curbing downturns but failing to deter excessive risk-taking. These asymmetries, alongside changes in expectations and risk appetite, drive financial activity outside regulatory oversight, exacerbating instability. The article emphasizes the need for adaptive, evolving regulatory frameworks to contain endogenous tendencies toward instability. While post-crisis reforms improved stability by addressing leverage, capital, and shadow banking, static aspects of the framework risk future erosion, as agent behavior adapts to extended periods of stability. JEL Classification: B52, G01, G28

Review of Radical Political EconomicsVol. 57(4)
University of Denver (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 80%
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

The Institutional Evolution of the US Financial System 1945–2023: Policy Implications of the Long-Wave Financial Cycle and Thwarting System Asymmetries — Yeo Hyub Yoon, Shaun K. Brog · Review of Radical Political Economics (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS